## DECIDING BETWEEN TWO SIMPLE HYPOTHESES

## 1. Definitions of size and power of tests

Let $H_{0}$ be any simple hypothesis, specifying a likelihood function $f_{0}=f_{0}(x)$. For any test of the hypothesis, the size of the test is the probability of rejecting $H_{0}$ when it's true. The convention we have been using has been to set sizes $\alpha$ of tests at .05 , but in testing against a simple alternative, other sizes with $0 \leq \alpha<1$ are possible. If a test statistic has a discrete set of values, there may be no test based on it of size equal to 0.05 .

Suppose $H_{1}$ is another simple hypothesis such that exactly one of $H_{0}$ and $H_{1}$ is true. Then the power of a test of $H_{0}$ against the alternative $H_{1}$ is the probability of (correctly) rejecting $H_{0}$ (and deciding in favor of $H_{1}$ ) if $H_{1}$ is true. Both small size and large power are good properties, but there is a tradeoff between the two.

Suppose we have two hypotheses, $H_{0}$ and $H_{1}$, such that if $H_{i}$ holds, the likelihood function for one observation is $f_{i}$ for $i=0,1$. In one sense, what we want to do is test the simple hypothesis $H_{0}$ against the simple alternative $H_{1}$. Another view is that we want to decide on one of $H_{0}$ or $H_{1}$.

## 2. The likelihood ratio and the Neyman-Pearson lemma

Let's define the likelihood ratio $L R(x)$ as $f_{1}(x) / f_{0}(x)$ if this is defined and finite; as $+\infty$ if $f_{0}(x)=0<f_{1}(x)$; and as 0 if $f_{1}(x)=f_{0}(x)=0$. If we have $X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}$ i.i.d. $f_{i}$ where $i$ is the same for all $X_{j}, i=0$ or 1 , and $i$ is unknown, we get a likelihood ratio $\prod_{j=1}^{n}\left(f_{1} / f_{0}\right)\left(X_{j}\right)$. An undefined product $0 \cdot \infty$ is not possible because if, say, $f_{1}\left(X_{j}\right)=0$, then with probability $1, i=0$, and then $f_{0}\left(X_{k}\right)>0$ for all $k=1, \ldots, n$. For each $C$ with $0<C<+\infty$ we can define two likelihood ratio tests of $H_{0}$ vs. $H_{1}$ : one is to reject $H_{0}$ and decide in favor of $H_{1}$ if $L R(x) \geq C$, and the other is similar but with $>C$ instead of $\geq C$. If $L R(x)$ has a continuous distribution under each of $H_{0}$ and $H_{1}$, then the probability that $L R(x)=C$ is 0 under either hypothesis and the two tests are essentially equivalent.

For deciding between $H_{0}$ and $H_{1}$, a basic fact is the following:

Theorem 1 (Neyman-Pearson Lemma). For any simple hypothesis $H_{0}$ and simple alternative $H_{1}$, for any $0<C<+\infty$, and either likelihood ratio test $T$ of $H_{0}$ vs. $H_{1}$ for that $C$, the power of $T$ against $H_{1}$ is as large, or larger, than that of any other test $U$ of $H_{0}$ vs. $H_{1}$ whose size is less or equal to that of $T$.

This fact follows from the formulation of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma given in Rice, p. 332, and proved there. A correction to Rice's statement: "and significance level $\alpha$ " should be "has significance level $\alpha$." In the terminology here one could say "has size $\alpha$."

## 3. Costs of errors

The question then is, how to choose $C$. One consideration is the costs of errors. Let $c_{i}$ be the cost (or loss) if $H_{i}$ is true but not chosen, for $i=$ 0,1 . Then $c_{0}$ and $c_{1}$ may be very different. For example, let $H_{0}$ be the hypothesis that an individual being tested does not have a disease $D$, and $H_{1}$ the hypothesis that the individual does have $D$. If the physician or tester decides in favor of $H_{1}$ while $H_{0}$ is true ("false positive"), then $c_{0}$ would include the cost (in money and time) of further tests until it was eventually realized that $H_{0}$ is true. Whereas, if a decision in favor of $H_{0}$ is made when $H_{1}$ is true, and if $D$ is serious, and there are good treatments for it, but it goes untreated for a while in the given patient, the disease may get worse and lead to quite a high cost $c_{1}$. Such a situation is asymmetric: there is no reason to think that $c_{0}=c_{1}$.

If a test has size $\alpha$ at $H_{0}$ and power $\beta$ against $H_{1}$, then if $H_{0}$ is true, the risk (expected cost) is $\alpha c_{0}$. If $H_{1}$ is true, the risk is $(1-\beta) c_{1}$. One might perhaps want to choose $C$ in a likelihood ratio test so as to minimize the maximum of these two risks.

## 4. Prior probabilities

But there is yet another consideration. There may be information available, based on which one may be able to assign a prior probability $\pi_{0}$ that $H_{0}$ is true, and so $\pi_{1}=1-\pi_{0}$ that $H_{1}$ is true, before doing the test. In the example, the disease $D$ may have a known prevalence (relative frequency of occurring) in a population including the person being tested of $\pi_{1}$, and then $\pi_{0}=1-\pi_{1}$. Including the prior probabilities, the overall risk of the test would be $\pi_{0} \alpha c_{0}+\pi_{1}(1-\beta) c_{1}$ and we'd like to choose $C$ in the likelihood ratio test to minimize this overall risk.

The overall likelihood function is $f(x)=\pi_{0} f_{0}(x)+\pi_{1} f_{1}(x)$. After doing the test, the posterior probability of $H_{0}$, or the conditional
probability that $H_{0}$ is true given that $x$ is observed, is

$$
\begin{equation*}
P\left(H_{0} \mid x\right)=\frac{\pi_{0} f_{0}(x)}{\pi_{0} f_{0}(x)+\pi_{1} f_{1}(x)} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

which follows from Bayes' theorem (or formula) in case of discrete distributions. For continuous distributions of $x$ we can consider the bivariate distribution of $(i, x)$ where $i=0$ or 1 . The marginal density of $x$ is $f$ and its conditional density given $i$ is $f_{i}$. The conditional probability that $H_{0}$ is true given $x$ is as shown in (1). Likewise, the conditional, or posterior, probability that $H_{1}$ is true given that $x$ is observed is

$$
\begin{equation*}
P\left(H_{1} \mid x\right)=\frac{\pi_{1} f_{1}(x)}{\pi_{0} f_{0}(x)+\pi_{1} f_{1}(x)} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

If $x$ is observed, the conditional $=$ posterior risk (expected cost) of choosing $H_{1}$ is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\pi_{0} f_{0}(x) c_{0}}{\pi_{0} f_{0}(x)+\pi_{1} f_{1}(x)}, \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

and the conditional risk (expected cost) of choosing $H_{0}$ is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\pi_{1} f_{1}(x) c_{1}}{\pi_{0} f_{0}(x)+\pi_{1} f_{1}(x)} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

We want to decide in favor of the hypothesis having smaller posterior risk. Since the denominators of (3) and (4) are the same, this means we want to choose $H_{1}$ if $\pi_{1} f_{1}(x) c_{1}>\pi_{0} f_{0}(x) c_{0}$, choose $H_{0}$ if $\pi_{1} f_{1}(x) c_{1}<\pi_{0} f_{0}(x) c_{0}$, and expect equal costs for either choice if $\pi_{1} f_{1}(x) c_{1}=\pi_{0} f_{0}(x) c_{0}$. All factors make intuitive sense: for any of $\pi_{i}$, $f_{i}(x)$, or $c_{i}$ to be larger than the corresponding numbers with $1-i$ in place of $i$ will incline us to choose $H_{i}$. We will choose $H_{1}$ if

$$
L R(x)=\frac{f_{1}(x)}{f_{0}(x)}>\frac{\pi_{0} c_{0}}{\pi_{1} c_{1}},
$$

which is a likelihood ratio test with $C=\pi_{0} c_{0} /\left(\pi_{1} c_{1}\right)$.

